Tuesday, July 31, 2012

Las Fregadas del Deferred Action

YouTube:
Presentacion del Lic. Gabriel Saavedra, abogado de inmigración del bufete Alcock and Associates
sobre
Las Consequencias y Riesgos del proceso actual de
ASAMBLEA GENERAL
de los
Comités de Defensa del Barrio
TONATIERRA
realizado el
lunes 30 de julio en el

NAHUACALLI
Embajada de Pueblos Indígenas
www.nahuacalli.org
802 N. 7th Street
Phoenix, AZ
Festival de Resistencia
sabado 22 de septiembre 2012
4:00 pm - 10:00 pm
GRATIS - FREE
Comida - Musica - Cultura
Conozca sus Derechos
el derecho de memoria
Cumple con sus Responsabilidades
*******
Derechos Civiles - Civil Rights
Derechos Humanos - Human Rights
Derechos Indígenas - Indigenous Rights
Derechos de la Madre Tierra -Rights of Mother Earth 
c l a n e s d e d e s t i n o  
no alcohol - no drogas- no armas
Festival Familiar
¡ SOMOS PUEBLO  !  
www.tonatierra.org 

FaceBook:
comitesdedefensadelbarrio
Website:
www.comitesdedefensadelbarrio 

Monday, July 30, 2012

La Primavara de Los Pueblos: El Carcel de los Estados


TONATIERRA
Los Comités de Defensa del Barrio
Date: July 30, 2012
Phoenix, Aztlan - Donde vive el espíritu de la verdad
Press Release


Confederciones Culturales del Pueblo Uto-Azteca
Hace casi 40 años hubo un debate que nos dividió en la cuestión de la identidad a tal punto que las organizaciones se dividieron en las que se identificaban como Xicanos, y los que no. Por supuesto la división fue fomentada por intereses gubernamentales impulsados por J. Edgar Hoover que se interesaba en desbaratar el Movimiento Xicano que tomaba fuerza y promovía identidad ancestral en las universidades y en la sociedad.  Fue en 1970 que el estado lanzo su contra ataque en la guerra psicológica mental y nos bautizo Hispanos en el censo del 1970 bajo la administración Nixon.  La confusión hoy por esta identificación postiza es evidente en nuestra juventud.
Mas uno: 2012
En esos tiempos bajo el movimiento Xicano resurgía la búsqueda histórica de nuestras raíces. Corky González en su poema “Yo Soy Joaquín” pintaba una confusa identidad basada en el mestizaje del México post revolucionario donde el Dr. Vasconcelos encargado de la educación post revolucionaria cayo en la trampa de razas en oposición al naciente racismo NAZI y se invento la Raza Cósmica como superior a la blanca pues era una mescolanza de razas en México. Escondida estaba la verdadera intención del mestizaje en el proyecto de nación post-revolucionaria. “Un Mestizo mas es un Indio menos.”
Ancestral Trade Corridors of Anahuac
Hoy se ha confundido aun mas nuestra identidad, la esconden detrás del status migratorio que además de bautizarnos “Hispano” y “Latino” nos etiqueta de “Indocumentados.”  Negamos nuestra identidad aun mas, manifestando la enajenación mental a la que hemos sido sometidos al gritar con el mismo furor de Hispano y Latino, la identidad de “Sin Papeles.”  Todos esos marcos de identidad sobrepuestos tienen el efecto de enajenarnos de nuestra verdadera conexión a estos territorios ancestrales que nos legalizan como hijos desde antes de las migraciones Mexicas y Chichimecas, y nos amamantaron desde la cuna  con la lengua Uto-Azteca, la matriz lingüística que nos conecta desde Centro América hasta la frontera de la hoy llamada Canadá.
Confederacion Cuauhtli - Confederations of the Eagle
Otra vez los intereses ajenos en reformas migratorias definen nuestro mensaje para negar la verdad histórica y así castrarnos colectivamente de nuestra identidad indígena.  A cambio de promesas de “papeles” nos divide entre “legales” e “ilegales” y limita las posibilidad de una conciencia histórica que antecede fronteras impuestas sobre nuestras poblaciones para después colonizar nuestro pensamiento, palabra, y obra.  No es por nada que se han eliminado los estudios étnicos en Arizona.  Las futuras generaciones, a menos que les enseñemos nosotros adoptaran la identidad de “legales, e ilegales, de documentados e indocumentados, de con papeles y sin papeles,” desviando la lucha por el reconocimiento indígena que se libra en todo el mundo, las naciones unidas, y en las cortes internacionales a un pasaporte o una visa otorgada por los invasores.
Abya Yala, Cemanahuac
El marco de la lucha no es una “Green Card,” es el de recuperar e implementar nuestros derechos como pueblos indígenas antecedentes a las fronteras coloniales impuestas.  Nuestros derechos como “Pueblos” ya han sido codificados en Declaraciones de los Derechos Plenos de Los Pueblos Indígenas así como en las Declaraciones de Derechos Humanos a los que la mayoría de los gobiernos del mundo han adoptado como base.  Aun si las naciones coloniales han impuesto sus leyes sobre nosotros. Se ha establecido claramente que no somos indocumentados, no somos sin papeles, somos pueblos originarios.

Salvador Reza  
La Primavera de los Pueblos
 

Sunday, July 29, 2012

Immigration Reform and the position of Indigenous Peoples


Editorial Tequio, March 29, 2010
Thursday, June 3, 2010
Posted by Gaspar Rivera-Salgado
Frente Indígena Oaxaqueno Bi-Nacional (FIOB)
Presently in the United States two great debates encumber the daily reality of we indigenous migrants communities.  One is the debate over immigration reform and the other is related to the crisis in the rural communities of Mexico Profundo.*

As for the debate on immigration reform we once again recently witnessed the tragic loss of the opportunity to push for reforms in public policy that advance real justice for migrants in the United States and their families in Mexico. In this debate what is most unfortunate is the lack of a transnational vision that would redefine the context in which the phenomenon of migration is no longer understood as a purely domestic problem but linked to the now almost complete economic integration between Mexico and the United States.

We must recognize on both sides of the border between Mexico and the United States that migration is here to stay as it is the result of economic and social processes reflecting the social integration between the two countries that has occurred without any serious discussion of the social terms under which the process unfolds.
Ancestral Indigenous Trade Routes
The lack of debate on the social terms of this economic integration and the resulting poverty that has been propagated among the Indigenous and Mexican campesino communities has resulted in the invisibility of thousands of people displaced by these same economic forces who resurface as victims only when they become tagged as “illegal migrants” in the United States.

Indeed the debate on migration policies in the United States is but a discussion on the results and the visible effects of deeper problems that have been developing and intensifying over the past three decades - this is the growing economic inequality suffered internally in Mexico and more specifically the lack of economic alternatives for rural communities in Mexico.

It is commonplace to say that rural Mexico has lived in a permanent economic crisis since the early eighties.  However, very little is said about the human dimensions of this crisis.  When the elites of the United States and Mexico decided to agree on a framework of economic integration that would allow the free movement of capital and goods between Mexico and the United States, while leaving the issue of labor migration outside of the framework of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the results were the foundations for the current situation of displacement of campesino and indigenous rural Mexicans and the almost impossible task of sustaining local economies in rural areas.

NAFTA, the international economic policy that has displaced millions of rural Mexicans, has had more impact on the ongoing development of the migration of Mexicans to the United States than any other contemporary event.

And it is here precisely that the Indigenous Bi-national Front of Oaxaca (FIOB) proposes that there is a need to expand and emphasize transnational analysis in the immigration debate. We must bring to the table of discussion, the simple fact that in the absence of real economic opportunities and a range of public policies channeled positively to impact the opportunities and rights of indigenous peoples and peasant communities in Mexico Profundo, there will be no realistic possibility to contend with the issues of the short and long term flow of undocumented workers.

Until we establish the Right Not To Migrate, the right to be fully realized with self determination in our home communities as the fundamental centerpiece of immigration policy we cannot expect to escape the tide of injustices sweeping our communities today on both sides of the border.

Translation: TONATIERRA
Link:
Terracidia y La Ley De Excepciones
El TLC y La Declaracion sobre Derechos de Los Pueblos Indigenas de la ONU
###
*  México Profundo: Reclaiming a Civilization
By Guillermo Bonfil Batalla
                         
This translation of a major work in Mexican anthropology argues that Mesoamerican civilization is an ongoing and undeniable force in contemporary Mexican life.

For Guillermo Bonfil Batalla, the remaining Indian communities, the "de-Indianized" rural mestizo communities, and vast sectors of the poor urban population constitute the México profundo. Their lives and ways of understanding the world continue to be rooted in Mesoamerican civilization. An ancient agricultural complex provides their food supply, and work is understood as a way of maintaining a harmonious relationship with the natural world. Health is related to human conduct, and community service is often part of each individual's life obligation. Time is circular, and humans fulfill their own cycle in relation to other cycles of the universe.

Since the Conquest, Bonfil argues, the peoples of the México profundo have been dominated by an "imaginary México" imposed by the West. It is imaginary not because it does not exist, but because it denies the cultural reality lived daily by most Mexicans.

Within the México profundo there exists an enormous body of accumulated knowledge, as well as successful patterns for living together and adapting to the natural world. To face the future successfully, argues Bonfil, Mexico must build on these strengths of Mesoamerican civilization, "one of the few original civilizations that humanity has created throughout all its history."

TONATIERRA
www.tonatierra.org 

La reforma migratoria y la posición de los pueblos indígenas


Editorial El Tequio, Marzo 29, 2010
Thursday, June 3, 2010
La reforma migratoria y la posición de los pueblos indígenas

Existen hoy en día en los Estados Unidos dos grandes debates que nos incumben a los pueblos indígenas migrantes. Uno es el debate sobre la reforma migratoria y el otro esta relacionado con la crisis en las comunidades rurales en el México profundo.

En cuanto al debate de la reforma migratoria otra vez presenciamos la trágica perdida de la oportunidad de empujar por reformas en las políticas públicas que realmente avancen la justicia para los migrantes en Los Estados Unidos y para sus familias en México. En este debate lo más lamentable es la falta de una visión transnacional que permita redefinir el contexto en que se visualiza el fenómeno de la migración, ya no como un fenómeno entendido como un problema meramente doméstico sino ligado a la ya casi completa integración económica entre México y los Estados Unidos.

Debemos reconocer en ambos lados de la frontera entre México y los Estados Unidos que la migración esta aquí para quedarse ya que es el resultado de procesos económicos y sociales resultados de esta integración que ha ocurrido sin el menor debate sobre los términos en los que esta ocurriendo.
Ancestral Indigenous Trade Routes of Anahuac

La falta de debate sobre los términos de esta integración económica y la pobreza que ha propagado entre los indígenas y campesinos mexicanos ha dado como resultado que los miles de desplazados por razones económicas se mantengas como las victimas invisibles quienes solo resurgen cuando se convierten en migrantes ilegales en los Estados Unidos. En verdad el debate sobre las políticas migratorias en los Estados Unidos no es sino el debate sobre los resultados y los efectos visibles de otro tipo de problemas que se han venido gestando y agudizando durante las pasadas tres décadas—y esto es la creciente desigualdad económica que se padece en México y más específicamente la falta de alternativas económicas para las comunidades rurales en México.
Ancestral Language Federations of Abya Yala North
Resulta que es casi un lugar común decir que el México rural ha vivido en una crisis económica permanente desde principios de los ochentas. Sin embargo, poco se habla de la dimensión humana de esta crisis. Cuando las elites de Estados Unidos y México decidieron ponerse de acuerdo en un marco de integración económica que permitiera la libre circulación de capital y mercancías entre México y los Estados Unidos, dejando el tema de la migración de trabajadores fuera del marco del TLC, se pusieron los cimientos para la actual situación de desplazamiento de campesinos e indígenas del México rural y la casi imposible tarea de reactivar las economías locales rurales.

El TLC, como política económica internacional que ha desplazado a millones de mexicanos del campo, ha tenido más impacto en el desarrollo actual de la migración de mexicanos a los Estados Unidos que ningún otro acontecimiento contemporáneo.

Y es aquí donde el FIOB se propone poner mayor énfasis en el debate migratorio. Debemos de poner sobre la mesa del debate el simple hecho de que de no haber oportunidades económicas reales y una serie de políticas públicas encauzadas a impactar de manera positiva las oportunidades y derechos de los pueblos indígenas y comunidades campesinas en el México profundo, no habrá posibilidades de lidiar a corto y largo plazo con el flujo de trabajadores indocumentados.

Hasta que no pongamos el derecho a no migrar, el derecho a realizarse plenamente en nuestras comunidades de origen, como una pieza central del la política migratoria no podremos salir del empantamiento en que nos encontramos actualmente.

Posted by Gaspar Rivera-Salgado 

Posición del FIOB sobre la Reforma Migratoria

Frente Indígena de Organizaciones Binacionales ~ FIOB ~

En estos momentos cruciales en que se debate la reforma migratoria en Washington D.C. y cuando los ataques racistas y sin bases en la realidad surgen en estados como Arizona, el Frente Indígena de Organizaciones Binacionales (FIOB) después de analizar las diferentes propuestas entre nuestros comités localizados en Santa Rosa, Madera, Fresno, Santa Maria, Los Ángeles y San Diego, propone los siguientes puntos para una reforma migratoria justa y humana.

Legalización:
  • Que la reforma migratoria contemple una legalización rápida y justa para las personas indocumentadas que viven en los EE.UU.
  • Legalizar a toda la gente que se encuentre en Estados Unidos al momento de introducir la iniciativa de reforma migratoria, que no haya sido acusados de delitos graves. Que el proceso no tome más de 12 meses y que las cuotas sean accesibles (500 dólares).
  • Discriminalizar el hecho de ser migrante, ya que es un derecho humano buscar la sobrevivencia económica propia y de nuestras familias.
  • Restaurar el acceso a los beneficios sociales y de salud básicos como un derecho humano para los trabajadores inmigrantes y mantener los beneficios sociales para los trabajadores migrantes en general.
  • Que haya un camino rápido a la ciudadanía y a bajo costo para la gente que ya es residente permanente y que más personas queden exentas del examen de inglés, por ejemplo los indígenas monolingües.
  • Que se apruebe el Dream Act para que los estudiantes que hayan llegado a Estados Unidos antes de los 18 años puedan aplicar para un ajuste migratorio, pero que no tengan que pagar multas.
  • Usar las cuotas que pagarán los migrantes que busquen legalizarse para crear programas de entrenamiento vocacional y empleos.


Reunificación Familiar:
  • Más visas para residentes permanentes (Legal Permanent Resident, LPR)
  • Si la persona que está peticionando por sus familiares muere, que se permita la continuación del proceso para hacer posible el ajuste de estatus migratorio de los familiares.
  • Acelerar el tiempo que se toma el proceso de reunificación familiar.
  • Quitar las condiciones de esperar 3 a 10 años que no permite la reunificación familiar de una forma rápida.
  • Reducir el nivel de ingresos necesarios para poder inmigrar familiares.
  • Prohibir la deportación de refugiados e inmigrantes que salieron de sus países de origen antes de cumplir los 12 años.
La Familia by Joaquin Chiñas

Trabajadores Huéspedes:
  • ¡No más programas de trabajadores huéspedes! Pues se ha demostrado que no funcionan y violan los derechos humanos de los trabajadores.
  • Reformar los programas existentes para dar derechos a los trabajadores. Después de cinco años, hay que eliminar los programas.
  • Mientras estén vigentes los programas de trabajo temporales, los trabajadores huéspedes tengan el derecho a organizarse en sindicatos y que las autoridades garanticen que se respeten los derechos laborales y civiles de las personas que reciben visas para trabajo temporal, y que tendrán vivienda y transportación adecuadas.


Enforzamiento/Frontera:
  • En vez de destinar el dinero en la militarización en la frontera se debería de invertir en trabajos y proveer más servicios públicos.
  • Derrumbar los muros que matan a gente inocente que busca solo la sobrevivencia de sus familias.
  • Libertad de movimiento de las comunidades indígenas en las fronteras.
  • Reafirmar que la constitución de los EE.UU protega a todos sin importar su status migratorio.
  • Enjuiciar a los grupos de vigilantes que violen los derechos de los migrantes ya que claramente son grupos paramilitares que actúan fuera del marco legal de los EE.UU.
  • Revocar las leyes estatales que no permiten a la gente sin documentos a obtener un licencia de conducir.
  • Revocar todo tipo de programas de militarización en las fronteras.


Detenciones:
  • No a los centros de detención de migrantes. Cerrar estos centros de detención lo más pronto posible ya que violan los derechos de los migrantes a tener un proceso judicial justo con representación legal adecuada.
  • No al uso de agentes de policía para el enforzamiento de las leyes de migración que solo son competencia de las autoridades federales. Eliminar el acuerdo 287g.
  • No más a las detenciones de menores de edad y a las detenciones de padres de hijos de ciudadanos estadounidenses.

Sanciones a Empleadores:
  • Quitar sanciones de los empleadores porque eso les da poder para explotar más a los trabajadores migrantes ya que estas sanciones los hace más vulnerables.
  • No al seguro social biométrico o e-verify.
  • Incrementar recursos y enforzamiento en salarios mínimo, tiempo extra, salud y seguridad de los trabajadores.
  • Respetar el derecho de los trabajadores inmigrantes a organizarse.
Ancestral Indigenous Trade Routes of Anahuac


Política Económica/ TLC:
  • Trabajar para renegociar el TLC a largo plazo por ser una de las causas de la migración ya que crea pobreza y desigualdad dentro de México en las comunidades de origen y entre ambos paises.
  • Organizar una comisión de verdad sobre los impactos económicos y sociales del TLC.
  • Reparaciones económicas para las personas desplazadas, invirtiendo recursos en sus comunidades de origen para que no tengan que migrar a EE.UU.
  • Prohibir la intervención militar o apoyo de los Estados Unidos para enforzar acuerdos de libre comercio.
  • Dar prioridad a los inmigrantes provenientes de las regiones impactadas por el TLC y que fueron desplazados como consecuencia de éste, para obtener visas de reunificación familiar.
“Por El Respeto a Los Derechos de Los Pueblos Indígenas”
Los Miembros de la Coordinación Binacional y la Coordinación Estatal en California.
Descargar una copia de esta página aquí.
 

MEXICO: Massive Vote Buying, a translatlantic operation



Finally Jose Luis Ponce de Aquino was taken seriously by the electoral authorities in the case of the massive purchase of votes by the PRI and the alleged illegal peñista campaign financing …  Or so it seems for now. 

The American businessman who sued in a California court the team of Enrique Peña Nieto, allegedly for breach of a payment of millions, now launches more serious charges, which are documented in PROCESO.  According to him, the web of financial maneuvers to power the PRI campaign has an international reach, as well as probable links with organized crime.

Extending from Mexico, but with ramifications in other countries, politicians and businessmen contrived to formulate complex financial transactions in order to triangulate multi-million dollar monetary resources and buy the presidency for Enrique Peña Nieto. In this complex operation there is also evidence of money laundering.

Information in the possession of PROCESO indicates that it is an international financial operation that extends into Spain, Italy, Israel and the United States where resources were triangulated eventually to be deposited in Monex Bank for use by the PRI in the presidential campaign of Peña Nieto.

Revealed in this network are characters whose names are linked to the PRI's presidential candidate and the companies of GAP, HIGO, Jiramos, and GM Global as well as of the banks Mifel and Monex.

The scheme is similar to the money laundering operations of organized crime, says Deputy PT Jaime Cardenas, head of the legal team of the Progressive Movement coalition and who as counselor to the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) participated in the investigation of the case Amigos del Fox, which triangulated million dollars from abroad to the campaign of the PAN presidential candidate in 2000.

The pending investigation

The IFE Control Unit and has a line of research that points to the location of money presumably transferred from the foreign sources. This is considered in its report on the progress of the investigation arising from complaints made separately by the PRD and the PAN against the PRI for alleged vote buying through Monex Rewards cards, also used to pay delegates and representatives of ballot box locations.

Among the research included in the record Q-UFRPP 58/12 of the Unit now in the charge of Alfredo Cristalinas Kaulitz, as regards the fourth point - establishment of the use and linkage of Monex cards with the electoral process - it is expected that the investigation will uncover from which countries arrangements were made and via what businesses in relationship to which political parties were resources allocated for the funding and use of such cards.
In the path of inquiry, made public at a meeting on Thursday 26 - first is the identification of the types of funding and the use of the cards. Second, the determination of the expenditures made in each of the lots of cards and this is where would become evident the date of the transactions, their amount, the city and country of origin of the funds.
Also to be investigated is the relationship of individual “legal representatives, shareholders, agents, employees of corporations, among others", with political parties.

This is where the Control Unit strand seeks to unravel the complex financial strategy of millions of dollars which funded the campaign of Enrique Peña Nieto, who on June 14 revealed the connection to Mexican-American businessman Jose Luis Ponce de Aquino, owner of the Border Television Network television company LLP.
In a complaint filed in the U.S., Ponce de Aquino stated in October last year, that Enrique Peña Nieto operators offered him a contract for 56 million dollars to promote the PRI presidential candidate in the US in coordination with the campaign in Mexico.

The businessman stated that this agreement was actualized by this amount of money deposited by the representatives of the PRI's presidential candidate in Banco Monex and Banco Mifel in a single day.

Not only that but Ponce de Aquino said he witnessed the alleged transfer of bank accounts with money of unknown origin, from banks based in Italy, Israel "and another Portuguese or Brazilian bank" to an account at Monex Bank branch in Mexico City on behalf the company Jiramos, owned by Alejandro Carrillo Garza Sada, who had contacted him to do the advertising campaign for the PRI in the United States.
Ancestral Indigenous Trade Corridors of Anahuac
In the suit filed in Central District Court of California for fraud, after allegedly Peña Nieto representatives failed to make good on the payment of the $56 million in deposits made at Mifel and Monex, the entrepreneur states something more serious: suspicion that there might be money from organized crime included those transactions.

The case of Control Unit of the IFE points out: "That  C. Jose Luis Ponce de Aquino claims to have received death threats from C. José Alfredo Carrillo, Alfredo Carrillo Chontkowsky and Hugo Vigo, who warned him that the $56 million was in exchange for an image campaign in the U.S. for the PRI candidate which ‘came from companies related to the narco industry’, and that businessman Alejandro Carrillo Garza Sada told him, ‘You better not do anything or I am even going to prohibit your entry to Mexico and I will take your business’, the latter through its representative, the C. Francisco Torres."
When reporting this story publicly, Ponce de Aquino empowered the Movimiento Progresista and the PAN to intercede with separate complaints with the IFE against the PRI for alleged use of resources "of unknown origin" and that the financial authorities began to search the home country and the path of those 56 million dollars that the businessman says were deposited at Monex and Mifel and served for the campaign Peña Nieto.
Eleazar Camerino Marquez, representive of the PRD to the IFE, argues that the Attorney General's Office and the National Banking and Securities Commission and the Control Unit of the Institute must have in hand presently the hard data and specifics of these transfers along with account numbers, amounts, cash flows and allocation of funds.

On June 19 the official of the PRD made a request to the Control Unit to be informed of the progress of the investigation into this case. Alfredo Cristalinas said in the report UF/DRN/7194/2012 that such information was embargoed until the investigations conclude.

"There is no way to hide the scandal of the funds triangulated via Monex. It is clear that the financial system is not unique to Mexico, we are in an age where everything is interacting; this we saw in the case of HSBC where outside bodies detected the trail of money laundering. There is also a history of previous investigations of money laundering via Monex due to connections with international illicit drug commerce involving Spain and other European countries. This trail is recorded and therefore would be a line of investigation that the authorities should investigate.", said the PRD representative.
(Excerpt from article appearing this week in the magazine PROCESO 1865, already in circulation.)
 Translation: TONATIERRA 
Links:

Friday, July 27, 2012

Arizona Et Al. v. United States


OCTOBER TERM, 2011
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
ARIZONA ET AL. v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 11–182. Argued April 25, 2012—Decided June 25, 2012

An Arizona statute known as S. B. 1070 was enacted in 2010 to address pressing issues related to the large number of unlawful aliens in the State. The United States sought to enjoin the law as preempted. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction preventing four of its provisions from taking effect. Section 3 makes failure to comply with federal alien-registration requirements a state misdemeanor; §5(C)makes it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage in work in the State; §6 authorizes state and local officers to arrest without a warrant a person “the officer has probable cause to believe . . . has committed any public offense that makes the person removable from the United States”; and §2(B) requires officers conducting a stop, detention, or arrest to make efforts, in some circumstances, toverify the person’s immigration status with the Federal Government. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the United States had established a likelihood of success on its preemption claims.

Held:
1.  The Federal Government’s broad, undoubted power over immigration and alien status rests, in part, on its constitutional power to“establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” Art. I, §8, cl. 4, and onits inherent sovereign power to control and conduct foreign relations, see Toll v. Moreno, 458 U. S. 1, 10. Federal governance is extensive and complex. Among other things, federal law specifies categories ofaliens who are ineligible to be admitted to the United States, 8
U. S. C. §1182; requires aliens to register with the Federal Government and to carry proof of status, §§1304(e), 1306(a); imposes sanctions on employers who hire unauthorized workers, §1324a; and specifies which aliens may be removed and the procedures for doing so, see §1227. Removal is a civil matter, and one of its principal features is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials, who must decide whether to pursue removal at all. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), an agency within the Department of Homeland Security, is responsible for identifying, apprehending, and removing illegal aliens. It also operates the Law Enforcement Support Center,which provides immigration status information to federal, state, andlocal officials around the clock. Pp. 2–7.

2.  The Supremacy Clause gives Congress the power to preempt state law. A statute may contain an express preemption provision, see, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting, 563 U. S. ___, ___, but state law must also give way to federal law in at least two other circumstances. First, States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress has determinedmust be regulated by its exclusive governance. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U. S. 88, 115. Intent can be inferred from a framework of regulation “so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it” or where a “federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230. Second, state laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law, including when theystand “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67. Pp. 7–8.

3.  Sections 3, 5(C), and 6 of S. B. 1070 are preempted by federal law. Pp. 8–19.

(a)  Section 3 intrudes on the field of alien registration, a field inwhich Congress has left no room for States to regulate. In Hines, a state alien-registration program was struck down on the ground that Congress intended its “complete” federal registration plan to be a “single integrated and all-embracing system.” 312 U. S., at 74. That scheme did not allow the States to “curtail or complement” federallaw or “enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.” Id., at 66–67. The federal registration framework remains comprehensive. Because Congress has occupied the field, even complementary state regulationis impermissible. Pp. 8–11.

(b)  Section 5(C)’s criminal penalty stands as an obstacle to the federal regulatory system. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), a comprehensive framework for “combating the employment of illegal aliens,” Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U. S. 137, 147, makes it illegal for employers to knowingly hire, recruit, refer, or continue to employ unauthorized workers, 8 U.S.C. §§1324a(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), and requires employers to verify prospective employees’ employment authorization status, §§1324a(a)(1)(B), (b).  It imposes criminal and civil penalties on employers, §§1324a(e)(4), (f), but only civil penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment, e.g., §§1255(c)(2), (c)(8).IRCA’s express preemption provision, though silent about whether additional penalties may be imposed against employees, “does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles” or impose a “special burden” making it more difficult to establish the preemptionof laws falling outside the clause. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861, 869–872. The correct instruction to draw from the text, structure, and history of IRCA is that Congress decided it would be inappropriate to impose criminal penalties on unauthorized employees. It follows that a state law to the contrary is an obstacle tothe regulatory system Congress chose. Pp. 12–15.

(c) By authorizing state and local officers to make warrantless arrests of certain aliens suspected of being removable, §6 too createsan obstacle to federal law. As a general rule, it is not a crime for aremovable alien to remain in the United States. The federal scheme instructs when it is appropriate to arrest an alien during the removal process. The Attorney General in some circumstances will issue awarrant for trained federal immigration officers to execute. If no federal warrant has been issued, these officers have more limited authority. They may arrest an alien for being “in the United States inviolation of any [immigration] law or regulation,” for example, but only where the alien “is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.” §1357(a)(2). Section 6 attempts to provide state officers with even greater arrest authority, which they could exercise with no instruction from the Federal Government. This is not the system Congress created. Federal law specifies limited circumstances in which state officers may perform an immigration officer’s functions. This includes instances where the Attorney General has granted that authority in a formal agreement with a state or local government. See, e.g., §1357(g)(1). Although federal law permits state officers to “cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the UnitedStates,” §1357(g)(10)(B), this does not encompass the unilateral decision to detain authorized by §6. Pp. 15–19.

4. It was improper to enjoin §2(B) before the state courts had an opportunity to construe it and without some showing that §2(B)’s enforcement in fact conflicts with federal immigration law and its objectives. Pp. 19–24.

(a) The state provision has three limitations: A detainee is presumed not to be an illegal alien if he or she provides a valid Arizona driver’s license or similar identification; officers may not consider race, color, or national origin “except to the extent permitted by the United States [and] Arizona Constitution[s]”; and §2(B) must be “implemented in a manner consistent with federal law regulating immigration, protecting the civil rights of all persons and respecting the privileges and immunities of United States citizens.” P. 20.

(b)  This Court finds unpersuasive the argument that, even with those limits, §2(B) must be held preempted at this stage. Pp. 20–24.

(1)  The mandatory nature of the status checks does not interfere with the federal immigration scheme. Consultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system. In fact, Congress has encouraged the sharing of information about possible immigration violations. See §§1357(g)(10)(A), 1373(c). The federal scheme thus leaves room for a policy requiring state officials to contact ICE as a routine matter. Cf. Whiting, 563 U. S., at ___. Pp. 20–21.

(2)  It is not clear at this stage and on this record that §2(B), in practice, will require state officers to delay the release of detainees for no reason other than to verify their immigration status. This would raise constitutional concerns. And it would disrupt the federal framework to put state officers in the position of holding aliens in custody for possible unlawful presence without federal direction and supervision. But §2(B) could be read to avoid these concerns. If the law only requires state officers to conduct a status check during the course of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been released, the provision would likely survive preemption—at least absent some showing that it has other consequences that are adverse tofederal law and its objectives. Without the benefit of a definitive interpretation from the state courts, it would be inappropriate to assume §2(B) will be construed in a way that conflicts with federal law. Cf. Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273, 277. This opinion does not foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied after it goes into effect. Pp. 22–24.

641 F. 3d 339, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., THOMAS, J., and ALITO, J., filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. KAGAN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
_____________________________________________________________________________
Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 11–182
ARIZONA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[June 25, 2012]

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

To address pressing issues related to the large numberof aliens within its borders who do not have a lawful right to be in this country, the State of Arizona in 2010 enacted a statute called the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act. The law is often referred to as S. B. 1070, the version introduced in the state senate. See also H. 2162 (2010) (amending S. 1070). Its stated purpose is to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States.” Note following Ariz.Rev. Stat. Ann. §11–1051 (West 2012). The law’s provisions establish an official state policy of “attrition through enforcement.” Ibid. The question before the Court is whether federal law preempts and renders invalid four separate provisions of the state law.

I

The United States filed this suit against Arizona, seeking to enjoin S. B. 1070 as preempted. Four provisions of the law are at issue here. Two create new state offenses. Section 3 makes failure to comply with federal alienregistration requirements a state misdemeanor. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–1509 (West Supp. 2011). Section 5, in relevant part, makes it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage in work in the State; this provision is referred to as §5(C). See §13–2928(C). Two other provisions give specific arrest authority and inves- tigative duties with respect to certain aliens to state and local law enforcement officers. Section 6 authorizes officers to arrest without a warrant a person “the officer has probable cause to believe . . . has committed any public offense that makes the person removable from the United States.” §13–3883(A)(5). Section 2(B) provides that officers who conduct a stop, detention, or arrest must in some circumstances make efforts to verify the person’s immigration status with the Federal Government. See §11–1051(B) (West 2012).

The United States District Court for the District of Arizona issued a preliminary injunction preventing the four provisions at issue from taking effect. 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1008 (2010). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 641 F. 3d 339, 366 (2011). It agreed that the United States had established a likelihood of success on its preemption claims. The Court of Appeals was unanimous in its conclusion that §§3 and 5(C) were likely preempted. Judge Bea dissented from the decision to uphold the preliminary injunction against §§2(B) and 6.This Court granted certiorari to resolve important questions concerning the interaction of state and federal power with respect to the law of immigration and alien status.565 U. S. ___ (2011).

II
A

The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U. S. 1, 10 (1982); see generally S. Legomsky & C. Rodríguez, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy 115–132 (5th ed. 2009). This authority rests, in part, on the National Government’s constitutional power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 4, and its inherent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign nations, see Toll, supra, at 10 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 318 (1936)).

The federal power to determine immigration policy is well settled. Immigration policy can affect trade, investment, tourism, and diplomatic relations for the entire Nation, as well as the perceptions and expectations of aliens in this country who seek the full protection of its laws. See, e.g., Brief for Argentina et al. as Amici Curiae; see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 588–589 (1952). Perceived mistreatment of aliens in the United States may lead to harmful reciprocal treatmentof American citizens abroad. See Brief for Madeleine K. Albright et al. as Amici Curiae 24–30.

It is fundamental that foreign countries concerned about the status, safety, and security of their nationals in the United States must be able to confer and communicate on this subject with one national sovereign, not the 50 separate States. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275, 279– 280 (1876); see also The Federalist No. 3, p. 39 (C. Rossiter ed. 2003) (J. Jay) (observing that federal power would be necessary in part because “bordering States . . . under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of apparent interest or injury” might take action that would undermine foreign relations). This Court has reaffirmed that “[o]ne of the most important and delicate of all international relationships . . . has to do with the protection of the just rights of a country’s own nationals when those nationals are in another country.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 64 (1941).  

Federal governance of immigration and alien status is extensive and complex. Congress has specified categories of aliens who may not be admitted to the United States. See 8 U. S. C. §1182. Unlawful entry and unlawful reentry into the country are federal offenses. §§1325, 1326. Once here, aliens are required to register with the Federal Government and to carry proof of status on their person. See §§1301–1306. Failure to do so is a federal misdemeanor. §§1304(e), 1306(a). Federal law also authorizes States to deny noncitizens a range of public benefits, §1622; and it imposes sanctions on employers who hire unauthorized workers, §1324a.

Congress has specified which aliens may be removed from the United States and the procedures for doing so. Aliens may be removed if they were inadmissible at thetime of entry, have been convicted of certain crimes, ormeet other criteria set by federal law. See §1227. Removal is a civil, not criminal, matter. A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials. See Brief for Former Commissioners of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service as Amici Curiae 8–13 (hereinafter Brief for Former INS Commissioners). Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all. If removal proceedings commence, aliens may seek asylum and other discretionary relief allowing them to remain in the country or at least to leave withoutformal removal. See §1229a(c)(4); see also, e.g., §§1158(asylum), 1229b (cancellation of removal), 1229c (voluntary departure).

Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate human concerns.  Unauthorized workers trying to support their families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime. The equities of an individual case may turn on many factors, including whether the alienhas children born in the United States, long ties to the community, or a record of distinguished military service.Some discretionary decisions involve policy choices that bear on this Nation’s international relations. Returning an alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has committed a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission. The foreign state maybe mired in civil war, complicit in political persecution, or enduring conditions that create a real risk that the alien or his family will be harmed upon return. The dynamic nature of relations with other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure that enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation’s foreign policy with respect to these and other realities.

Agencies in the Department of Homeland Security playa major role in enforcing the country’s immigration laws. United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for determining the admissibility of aliens and securing the country’s borders. See Dept. of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2010, p. 1 (2011). In 2010, CBP’s Border Patrol apprehended almost half a million people. Id., at 3. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a second agency, “conducts criminal investigations involving the enforcement of immigration-related statutes.” Id., at 2. ICE also operates the Law Enforcement Support Center. LESC, as the Center is known, provides immigration status information to federal, state, and local officials around the clock. See App. 91. ICE officers are responsible “for the identification, apprehension, and removal of illegal aliens from the United States.” Immigration Enforcement Actions, supra, at 2. Hundreds of thousands of aliens are removed by the Federal Government every year.See id., at 4 (reporting there were 387,242 removals, and 476,405 returns without a removal order, in 2010).


B

The pervasiveness of federal regulation does not diminish the importance of immigration policy to the States. Arizona bears many of the consequences of unlawful immigration. Hundreds of thousands of deportable aliensare apprehended in Arizona each year. Dept. of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2010 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 93 (2011) (Table 35). Unauthorized aliens who remain in the State comprise, by one es- timate, almost six percent of the population. See Passel & Cohn, Pew Hispanic Center, U. S. Unauthorized Im- migration Flows Are Down Sharply Since Mid-Decade 3(2010). And in the State’s most populous county, thesealiens are reported to be responsible for a disproportionateshare of serious crime. See, e.g., Camarota & Vaughan, Center for Immigration Studies, Immigration and Crime: Assessing a Conflicted Situation 16 (2009) (Table 3) (estimating that unauthorized aliens comprise 8.9% of thepopulation and are responsible for 21.8% of the felonies in Maricopa County, which includes Phoenix). Statistics alone do not capture the full extent of Arizona’s concerns. Accounts in the record suggest there is an“epidemic of crime, safety risks, serious property damage, and environmental problems” associated with the influxof illegal migration across private land near the Mexican border. Brief for Petitioners 6. Phoenix is a major city ofthe United States, yet signs along an interstate highway30 miles to the south warn the public to stay away. One reads, “DANGER—PUBLIC WARNING—TRAVEL NOT RECOMMENDED / Active Drug and Human Smuggling Area / Visitors May Encounter Armed Criminals and Smuggling Vehicles Traveling at High Rates of Speed.”App. 170; see also Brief for Petitioners 5–6. The problems posed to the State by illegal immigration must not be underestimated. These concerns are the background for the formal legal analysis that follows. The issue is whether, under preemption principles, federal law permits Arizona to implement the state-law provisions in dispute.

III

Federalism, central to the constitutional design, adopts the principle that both the National and State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 457 (1991); U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 838 (1995) (KENNEDY, J., concurring). From the existence of two sovereigns follows the possibility that laws can be in conflict or at cross-purposes. The Supremacy Clause provides a clear rule that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Art. VI, cl. 2. Under this principle, Congress has the power to preempt state law. See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363, 372 (2000); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 210–211 (1824). There is no doubt that Congress may withdraw specified powers from theStates by enacting a statute containing an express preemption provision. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 4).

State law must also give way to federal law in at least two other circumstances. First, the States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its proper authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U. S. 88, 115 (1992).  The intent to displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation “so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it” or where there is a “federal interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947); see English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U. S. 72, 79 (1990).

Second, state laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law. Crosby, supra, at 372. This includes cases where “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142–143 (1963), and those instances where the challenged state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” Hines, 312 U. S., at 67; see also Crosby, supra, at 373 (“What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects”). In preemption analysis, courts should assume that “the historic police powers of the States” are not superseded “unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Rice, supra, at 230; see Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 555, 565 (2009).

The four challenged provisions of the state law each must be examined under these preemption principles.

IV
A
Section 3

Section 3 of S. B. 1070 creates a new state misdemeanor. It forbids the “willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document . . . in violation of 8 United States Code section 1304(e) or 1306(a).” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §11–1509(A) (West Supp. 2011). In effect, §3 adds a state-law penalty for conduct proscribed by federal law. The United States contends that this state enforcement mechanism intrudes on the field of alien registration, a field in which Congress has left no room for States to regulate. See Brief for United States 27, 31.

The Court discussed federal alien-registration requirements in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52. In 1940, as international conflict spread, Congress added to federal immigration law a “complete system for alien registration.” Id., at 70. The new federal law struck a careful balance. It punished an alien’s willful failure to register but did not require aliens to carry identification cards.There were also limits on the sharing of registration records and fingerprints. The Court found that Congress intended the federal plan for registration to be a “single integrated and all-embracing system.” Id., at 74. Because this “complete scheme . . . for the registration of aliens” touched on foreign relations, it did not allow the States to “curtail or complement” federal law or to “enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.” Id., at 66–67. As a consequence, the Court ruled that Pennsylvania could not enforce its own alien-registration program. See id., at 59, 74. 

The present regime of federal regulation is not identical to the statutory framework considered in Hines, but it remains comprehensive. Federal law now includes a requirement that aliens carry proof of registration. 8 U. S. C. §1304(e). Other aspects, however, have stayed the same. Aliens who remain in the country for more than 30days must apply for registration and be fingerprinted. Compare §1302(a) with id., §452(a) (1940 ed.). Detailed information is required, and any change of address has to be reported to the Federal Government. Compare §§1304(a), 1305(a) (2006 ed.), with id., §§455(a), 456 (1940 ed.). The statute continues to provide penalties for thewillful failure to register. Compare §1306(a) (2006 ed.), with id., §457 (1940 ed.).

The framework enacted by Congress leads to the conclusion here, as it did in Hines, that the Federal Government has occupied the field of alien registration. See American Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, 539 U. S. 396, 419, n. 11 (2003) (characterizing Hines as a field preemption case); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U. S. 497, 504 (1956) (same); see also Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 Geo. L. J.2085, 2098–2099, 2107 (2000) (same). The federal statutory directives provide a full set of standards governing alien registration, including the punishment for noncompliance. It was designed as a “‘harmonious whole.’” Hines, supra, at 72. Where Congress occupies an entire field, as it has in the field of alien registration, even complementary state regulation is impermissible. Field preemption reflects a congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to federal standards. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 249 (1984).

Federal law makes a single sovereign responsible for maintaining a comprehensive and unified system to keeptrack of aliens within the Nation’s borders. If §3 of theArizona statute were valid, every State could give itself independent authority to prosecute federal registration violations, “diminish[ing] the [Federal Government]’s control over enforcement” and “detract[ing] from the ‘integrated scheme of regulation’ created by Congress.” Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould Inc., 475 U. S. 282, 288–289 (1986). Even if a State may make violation of federal law a crime in some instances, it cannot do so in a field (like the field of alien registration) that has been occupied by federal law. See California v. Zook, 336 U. S. 725, 730– 731, 733 (1949); see also In re Loney, 134 U. S. 372, 375– 376 (1890) (States may not impose their own punishment for perjury in federal courts).

Arizona contends that §3 can survive preemption because the provision has the same aim as federal law and adopts its substantive standards. This argument not only ignores the basic premise of field preemption—that States may not enter, in any respect, an area the Federal Government has reserved for itself—but also is unpersuasive on its own terms. Permitting the State to impose its own penalties for the federal offenses here would conflict with the careful framework Congress adopted. Cf. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U. S. 341, 347–348 (2001) (States may not impose their own punishment for fraud on the Food and Drug Administration); Wisconsin Dept., supra, at 288 (States may not impose their own punishment for repeat violations of the National Labor Relations Act). Were §3 to come into force, the State would have the power to bring criminal charges against individuals for violating a federal law even in circumstances where federal officials in charge of the comprehensive scheme determine that prosecution would frustrate federal policies.

There is a further intrusion upon the federal scheme. Even where federal authorities believe prosecution is appropriate, there is an inconsistency between §3 and federal law with respect to penalties. Under federal law, the failure to carry registration papers is a misdemeanor that may be punished by a fine, imprisonment, or a term of probation. See 8 U. S. C. §1304(e) (2006 ed.); 18 U. S. C. §3561. State law, by contrast, rules out probation as a possible sentence (and also eliminates the possibility ofa pardon). See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–1509(D) (West Supp. 2011). This state framework of sanctions creates a conflict with the plan Congress put in place. See Wisconsin Dept., supra, at 286 (“[C]onflict is imminent whenever two separate remedies are brought to bear on the same activity” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

These specific conflicts between state and federal law simply underscore the reason for field preemption. As it did in Hines, the Court now concludes that, with respectto the subject of alien registration, Congress intended to preclude States from “complement[ing] the federal law, or enforc[ing] additional or auxiliary regulations.” 312 U. S., at 66–67. Section 3 is preempted by federal law.


B
Section 5(C)

Unlike §3, which replicates federal statutory requirements, §5(C) enacts a state criminal prohibition where no federal counterpart exists. The provision makes it a state misdemeanor for “an unauthorized alien to knowingly ap- ply for work, solicit work in a public place or perform work as an employee or independent contractor” in Arizona. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–2928(C) (West Supp. 2011).Violations can be punished by a $2,500 fine and incarceration for up to six months. See §13–2928(F); see also §§13–707(A)(1) (West 2010); 13–802(A); 13–902(A)(5). The United States contends that the provision upsets the bal- ance struck by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) and must be preempted as an obstacleto the federal plan of regulation and control.

When there was no comprehensive federal program regulating the employment of unauthorized aliens, this Court found that a State had authority to pass its ownlaws on the subject. In 1971, for example, California passed a law imposing civil penalties on the employment of aliens who were “not entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers.” 1971 Cal. Stats. ch. 1442, §1(a). The law was upheld against a preemption challenge in De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1976). De Canas recognized that “States possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the State.” Id., at 356. At that point, however, the Federal Government had expressed no more than “a peripheral concern with [the] employment of illegal entrants.” Id., at 360; see Whiting, 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3).

Current federal law is substantially different from the regime that prevailed when De Canas was decided. Congress enacted IRCA as a comprehensive framework for “combating the employment of illegal aliens.” Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U. S. 137, 147 (2002). The law makes it illegal for employers to knowingly hire, recruit, refer, or continue to employ unauthorized workers. See 8 U. S. C. §§1324a(a)(1)(A), (a)(2).  It also requires every employer to verify the employment authorization status of prospective employees. See §§1324a(a)(1)(B), (b); 8 CFR §274a.2(b) (2012). These requirements are enforced through criminal penalties and an escalating series of civil penalties tied to the number of times an employer has violated the provisions. See 8 U. S. C. §§1324a(e)(4), (f); 8 CFR §274a.10.

This comprehensive framework does not impose federal criminal sanctions on the employee side (i.e., penalties on aliens who seek or engage in unauthorized work). Under federal law some civil penalties are imposed instead. With certain exceptions, aliens who accept unlawful employment are not eligible to have their status adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident. See 8 U. S. C. §§1255(c)(2), (c)(8). Aliens also may be removed from the country for having engaged in unauthorized work. See §1227(a)(1)(C)(i); 8 CFR §214.1(e). In addition to specifying these civil consequences, federal law makes it a crime for unauthorized workers to obtain employment through fraudulent means. See 18 U. S. C. §1546(b). Congress has made clear, however, that any information employees submit to indicate their work status “may not be used” for purposes other than prosecution under specified federal criminal statutes for fraud, perjury, and related conduct.See 8 U. S. C. §§1324a(b)(5), (d)(2)(F)–(G).

The legislative background of IRCA underscores the fact that Congress made a deliberate choice not to impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment. A commission established by Congress to study immigration policy and to make recommendations concluded these penalties would be “unnecessary and unworkable.” U. S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest: The Final Report and Recommendations ofthe Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy with Supplemental Views by Commissioners 65–66 (1981); see Pub. L. 95–412, §4, 92 Stat. 907. Proposals to makeunauthorized work a criminal offense were debated and discussed during the long process of drafting IRCA. See Brief for Service Employees International Union et al. as Amici Curiae 9–12. But Congress rejected them. See, e.g.,119 Cong. Rec. 14184 (1973) (statement of Rep. Dennis). In the end, IRCA’s framework reflects a considered judgment that making criminals out of aliens engaged in unauthorized work—aliens who already face the possibility of employer exploitation because of their removable status—would be inconsistent with federal policy and objectives. See, e.g., Hearings before the Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, pp. 919–920 (1971) (statement of Rep.Rodino, the eventual sponsor of IRCA in the House of Representatives).

IRCA’s express preemption provision, which in most instances bars States from imposing penalties on employers of unauthorized aliens, is silent about whether additional penalties may be imposed against the employees themselves. See 8 U. S. C. §1324a(h)(2); Whiting, supra,at ___–___ (slip op., at 1–2). But the existence of an “express pre-emption provisio[n] does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles” or impose a “special burden” that would make it more difficult to establish the preemption of laws falling outside the clause. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861, 869– 872 (2000); see Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U. S. 51, 65 (2002).

The ordinary principles of preemption include the wellsettled proposition that a state law is preempted where it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines, 312 U. S., at 67. Under §5(C) of S. B. 1070, Arizona law would interfere with the careful balance struck by Congress with respect to unauthorized employment of aliens. Although §5(C) attempts to achieve one of the same goals as federal law—the deterrence of unlawful employment—it involves a conflict in the method of enforcement. The Court has recognized that a “[c]onflict in technique can be fully as disruptive to the system Congress enacted as conflict in overt policy.” Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274, 287 (1971). The correct instruction to draw from the text, structure, and history of IRCA is that Congress decided it would be inappropriate to impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek or engage in unauthorized employment. It follows that a state law to the contrary is an obstacle to the regulatory system Congress chose. See Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer Affairs v. ISLA Petroleum Corp., 485 U. S. 495, 503 (1988) (“Where a comprehensive federal scheme intentionally leaves a portion of the regulated field without controls, then the pre-emptive inference can be drawn—not from federal inaction alone, but from inaction joined with action”). Section 5(C) is preempted by federal law.

C
Section 6

Section 6 of S. B. 1070 provides that a state officer,“without a warrant, may arrest a person if the officer has probable cause to believe . . . [the person] has committed any public offense that makes [him] removable from the United States.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–3883(A)(5) (West Supp. 2011). The United States argues that arrests authorized by this statute would be an obstacle to the removal system Congress created.

As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the United States. See INS v. Lopez Mendoza, 468 U. S. 1032, 1038 (1984). If the police stop someone based on nothing more than possible removability, the usual predicate for an arrest is absent. When an alien is suspected of being removable, a federal official issues an administrative document called a Notice to Appear. See 8 U. S. C. §1229(a); 8 CFR §239.1(a) (2012). The form does not authorize an arrest. Instead, it gives the alien information about the proceedings, including the time and date of the removal hearing. See 8 U. S. C. §1229(a)(1). If an alien fails to appear, an in absentia order may direct removal. §1229a(5)(A).

The federal statutory structure instructs when it is appropriate to arrest an alien during the removal process. For example, the Attorney General can exercise discretion to issue a warrant for an alien’s arrest and detention “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U. S. C. §1226(a); see Memorandum from John Morton, Director, ICE, to All Field Office Directors et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011) (hereinafter 2011 ICE Memorandum) (describing factors informing this and related decisions). And if an alien is ordered removed after a hearing, the Attorney General will issue a warrant. See 8 CFR §241.2(a)(1). In both instances, the warrants are executed by federal officers who have received training in the enforcement of immigration law. See §§241.2(b), 287.5(e)(3). If no federal warrant has been issued, those officers have more limited authority. See 8 U. S. C. §1357(a). They may arrest an alien for being “in the United States in violation of any [immigration] law or regulation,” for example, but only where the alien “is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.” §1357(a)(2).

Section 6 attempts to provide state officers even greater authority to arrest aliens on the basis of possible removability than Congress has given to trained federal immigration officers. Under state law, officers who believe an alien is removable by reason of some “public offense” would have the power to conduct an arrest on that basis regardless of whether a federal warrant has issued or the alien is likely to escape. This state authority could be exercised without any input from the Federal Government about whether an arrest is warranted in a particular case. This would allow the State to achieve its own immigration policy. The result could be unnecessary harassment of some aliens (for instance, a veteran, college student, or someone assisting with a criminal investigation) whom federal officials determine should not be removed.

This is not the system Congress created. Federal law specifies limited circumstances in which state officers may perform the functions of an immigration officer. A principal example is when the Attorney General has granted that authority to specific officers in a formal agreement with a state or local government. See §1357(g)(1); see also§1103(a)(10) (authority may be extended in the event of an“imminent mass influx of aliens off the coast of the United States”); §1252c (authority to arrest in specific circumstance after consultation with the Federal Government);§1324(c) (authority to arrest for bringing in and harboring certain aliens). Officers covered by these agreements are subject to the Attorney General’s direction and supervision. §1357(g)(3). There are significant complexities involved in enforcing federal immigration law, including the determination whether a person is removable. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2010) (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 4–7). As a result, the agreements reached with the Attorney General must contain written certification that officers have received adequate training to carry out the duties of an immigration officer. See §1357(g)(2); cf. 8 CFR §§287.5(c) (arrest power contingent on training), 287.1(g) (defining the training).

By authorizing state officers to decide whether an alien should be detained for being removable, §6 violates the principle that the removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government. See, e.g., Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U. S. 471, 483–484 (1999); see also Brief for Former INS Commissioners 8–13. A decision on removability requires a determination whether it is appropriate to allow a foreign national to continue living in the United States. Decisions of this nature touch on foreign relations and must be made with one voice. See Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S. 335, 348 (2005) (“Removal decisions, including the selection of a removed alien’s destination, may implicate [the Nation’s] relations with foreign powers and require consideration of changing political and economic circumstances” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, 531 (1954) (“Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are . . . entrusted exclusively to Congress. . .”); Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 42 (1915) (“The authority to control immigration—to admit or exclude aliens—is vested solely in the Federal Government”).

In defense of §6, Arizona notes a federal statute permitting state officers to “cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United States.” 8 U. S. C. §1357(g)(10)(B). There may be some ambiguity asto what constitutes cooperation under the federal law; but no coherent understanding of the term would incorporatethe unilateral decision of state officers to arrest an alien for being removable absent any request, approval, or other instruction from the Federal Government. The Department of Homeland Security gives examples of what would constitute cooperation under federal law. These include situations where States participate in a joint task force with federal officers, provide operational support in executing a warrant, or allow federal immigration officials to gain access to detainees held in state facilities. See Dept. of Homeland Security, Guidance on State and Local Governments’ Assistance in Immigration Enforcement and Related Matters 13–14 (2011), online at http://www.dhs.gov/files/resources/immigration.shtm (all Internet materials as visited June 21, 2012, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). State officials can also assist the Federal Government by responding to requests for information about when an alien will be released from their custody. See §1357(d). But the unilateral state action to detain authorized by §6 goes far beyond these measures, defeating any need for real cooperation.

Congress has put in place a system in which state officers may not make warrantless arrests of aliens based on possible removability except in specific, limited circumstances. By nonetheless authorizing state and local officers to engage in these enforcement activities as a generalmatter, §6 creates an obstacle to the full purposes andobjectives of Congress. See Hines, 312 U. S., at 67. Section 6 is preempted by federal law.

D
Section 2(B)

Section 2(B) of S. B. 1070 requires state officers to make a “reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration status” of any person they stop, detain, or arrest on some other legitimate basis if “reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §11–1051(B) (West 2012). The law also provides that “[a]ny person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status determined before the person is released.” Ibid. The accepted way to perform these status checks is to contact ICE,which maintains a database of immigration records.

Three limits are built into the state provision. First, a detainee is presumed not to be an alien unlawfully present in the United States if he or she provides a valid Arizona driver’s license or similar identification. Second, officers “may not consider race, color or national origin . . . except to the extent permitted by the United States [and] Arizona Constitution[s].” Ibid. Third, the provisions must be “implemented in a manner consistent with federal law regulating immigration, protecting the civil rights of all persons and respecting the privileges and immunities of United States citizens.” §11–1051(L) (West 2012).

The United States and its amici contend that, even with these limits, the State’s verification requirements pose anobstacle to the framework Congress put in place. The first concern is the mandatory nature of the status checks. The second is the possibility of prolonged detention while thechecks are being performed.


Consultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system. Congress has made clear that no formal agreement or special training needs to be in place for state officers to “communicate with the [Federal Government] regarding the immigration status of any individual, including reporting knowledge that a particular alien is not lawfully present in the United States.” 8 U. S. C. §1357(g)(10)(A). And Congress hasobligated ICE to respond to any request made by state officials for verification of a person’s citizenship or immigration status. See §1373(c); see also §1226(d)(1)(A) (requiring a system for determining whether individualsarrested for aggravated felonies are aliens). ICE’s Law Enforcement Support Center operates “24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year” and provides, amongother things, “immigration status, identity informationand real-time assistance to local, state and federal law enforcement agencies.” ICE, Fact Sheet: Law Enforcement Support Center (May 29, 2012), online at http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/lesc.htm. LESC responded to more than one million requests for information in 2009 alone. App. 93.

The United States argues that making status verification mandatory interferes with the federal immigration scheme. It is true that §2(B) does not allow state officers to consider federal enforcement priorities in deciding whether to contact ICE about someone they have detained. See Brief for United States 47–50. In other words, the officers must make an inquiry even in cases where it seems unlikely that the Attorney General would have the alien removed. This might be the case, for example,when an alien is an elderly veteran with significant and longstanding ties to the community. See 2011 ICE Memorandum 4–5 (mentioning these factors as relevant).

Congress has done nothing to suggest it is inappropriate to communicate with ICE in these situations, however.  Indeed, it has encouraged the sharing of information about possible immigration violations. See 8 U. S. C. §1357(g) (10)(A). A federal statute regulating the public benefits provided to qualified aliens in fact instructs that “no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from [ICE]information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.” §1644. The federal scheme thus leaves room for a policy requiring state officials to contact ICE as a routine matter. Cf. Whiting, 563 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 23–24) (rejecting argument that federal law preempted Arizona’s requirement that employers determine whether employees were eligible to work through the federal E-Verify system where the Federal Government had encouraged its use).


Some who support the challenge to §2(B) argue that, in practice, state officers will be required to delay the release of some detainees for no reason other than to verify their immigration status. See, e.g., Brief for Former Arizona Attorney General Terry Goddard et al. as Amici Curiae 37, n. 49. Detaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status would raise constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U. S. 323, 333 (2009); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405, 407 (2005) (“A seizure that isjustified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyondthe time reasonably required to complete that mission”).And it would disrupt the federal framework to put stateofficers in the position of holding aliens in custody forpossible unlawful presence without federal direction and supervision. Cf. Part IV–C, supra (concluding that Arizona may not authorize warrantless arrests on the basis of removability). The program put in place by Congress doesnot allow state or local officers to adopt this enforcement mechanism.

But §2(B) could be read to avoid these concerns. To take one example, a person might be stopped for jaywalking in Tucson and be unable to produce identification. The first sentence of §2(B) instructs officers to make a “reasonable” attempt to verify his immigration status with ICE if thereis reasonable suspicion that his presence in the United States is unlawful. The state courts may conclude that, unless the person continues to be suspected of some crime for which he may be detained by state officers, it would not be reasonable to prolong the stop for the immigration inquiry. See Reply Brief for Petitioners 12, n. 4 (“[Section2(B)] does not require the verification be completed duringthe stop or detention if that is not reasonable or practicable”); cf. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U. S. 93, 101 (2005) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where questioning about immigration status did not prolong a stop).

To take another example, a person might be held pending release on a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol. As this goes beyond a mere stop, the arrestee (unlike the jaywalker) would appear to be subject to the categorical requirement in the second sentence of §2(B)that “[a]ny person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status determined before [he] is released.” State courts may read this as an instruction to initiate a status check every time someone is arrested, or in some subset of those cases, rather than as a command to hold the person until the check is complete no matter the circumstances. Even if the law is read as an instruction to complete a check while the person is in custody, moreover, it is not clear at this stage and on this record that the verification process would result in prolonged detention.

However the law is interpreted, if §2(B) only requires state officers to conduct a status check during the course of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been released, the provision likely would survive pre-emption—at least absent some showing that it has other consequences that are adverse to federal law and its objectives. There is no need in this case to address whether reasonable suspicion of illegal entry or another immigration crime would be a legitimate basis for prolonging adetention, or whether this too would be preempted by federal law. See, e.g., United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, 589 (1948) (authority of state officers to make arrests for federal crimes is, absent federal statutory instruction, a matter of state law); Gonzales v. Peoria, 722 F. 2d 468, 475–476 (CA9 1983) (concluding that Arizona officers have authority to enforce the criminal provisions of federal immigration law), overruled on other grounds in Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F. 3d 1037 (CA9 1999).

The nature and timing of this case counsel caution inevaluating the validity of §2(B). The Federal Government has brought suit against a sovereign State to challenge theprovision even before the law has gone into effect. There is a basic uncertainty about what the law means and how it will be enforced. At this stage, without the benefit of a definitive interpretation from the state courts, it would be inappropriate to assume §2(B) will be construed in a waythat creates a conflict with federal law. Cf. Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273, 277 (1915) (“So far as statutes fairly may be construed in such a way as to avoid doubtful constitutional questions they should be so construed; and it is to be presumed that state laws will be construed in that way by the state courts” (citation omitted)). As a result, the United States cannot prevail in its current challenge. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440, 446 (1960) (“To hold otherwise would be to ignore the teaching of this Court’s decisions which enjoin seeking out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly exists”). This opinion does not foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied after it goes into effect.

V

Immigration policy shapes the destiny of the Nation.On May 24, 2012, at one of this Nation’s most distinguished museums of history, a dozen immigrants stood before the tattered flag that inspired Francis Scott Key to write the National Anthem. There they took the oath to become American citizens. The Smithsonian, News Release, Smithsonian Citizenship Ceremony Welcomes a Dozen New Americans (May 24, 2012), online athttp://newsdesk.si.edu/releases. These naturalization ceremonies bring together men and women of different origins who now share a common destiny. They swear a common oath to renounce fidelity to foreign princes, to defend the Constitution, and to bear arms on behalf of the country when required by law. 8 CFR §337.1(a) (2012).

The history of the United States is in part made of the stories, talents, and lasting contributions of those who crossed oceans and deserts to come here.

The National Government has significant power to regulate immigration. With power comes responsibility, and the sound exercise of national power over immigration depends on the Nation’s meeting its responsibility to baseits laws on a political will informed by searching, thoughtful, rational civic discourse. Arizona may have understandable frustrations with the problems caused by illegal immigration while that process continues, but the State may not pursue policies that undermine federal law.
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The United States has established that §§3, 5(C), and 6of S. B. 1070 are preempted. It was improper, however, toenjoin §2(B) before the state courts had an opportunity toconstrue it and without some showing that enforcement ofthe provision in fact conflicts with federal immigration law and its objectives.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE KAGAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.